## Letter from Pu'uloa1 by William Shepherd

When the United Kingdom declared war on Germany on 1<sup>st</sup> September 1939, US President Roosevelt was asked whether America would stay out. He replied: "I believe we can, and every effort will be made to do so." He appointed George Marshall as *Chief of Staff of the Army* over General Douglas MacArthur<sup>2</sup> and other senior officers.

Eleven days later Hans Thomson, German *Chargé d'affaires* in Washington cabled Berlin that if defeat threatened the *Allies* Roosevelt would go to war against Germany even in the face of the resistance of his own country.



Germany needed oil to wage war. Before Rumania was invaded by the Germans, it was selling oil to Germany. On 19<sup>th</sup> February 1940, five months war was declared, *Life* magazine ran a picture of Rumanian oil being loaded into oil tank cars. The caption read: 'Oil for Germany moves in these tank cars of *American Essolube* and *British Shell* out of *Creditui Minier* yards near Ploesti (Rumania)'. The cars were sent from Germany to speed up Rumanian oil shipments and were marked for *German-American Oil Co.* and *German Railways* to Hamburg and Wuppertal.

The picture was taken after Germany had invaded Austria and Poland and show American and British oil companies still transporting oil for the German government. The tank cars in the picture are clearly marked *Essolube* and *Shell*.

When the *German Luftwaffe* needed fuel, it was supplied in Spanish oil tankers from the *Standard Oil Company* refinery on the island of Aruba. This occurred during the war itself, yet these tankers were not sunk by American submarines. Even with the purchases of oil from non-German sources, the major supplier of oil was the cartel. The *I.G. Farben - Standard Oil* cooperation for production of synthetic oil from coal gave the *I.G. Farben* cartel a monopoly of German gasoline production during World War II. Just under one half of German high octane gasoline in 1945 was produced directly by *I.G. Farben*, and most of the balance by its affiliated companies.

As the war in Europe continued, Roosevelt, the presidential candidate for re-election, was promising that his administration would remain neutral. Not everybody believed him. General Hugh Johnson, for instance, said: "I know of no well informed Washington observer who isn't convinced that, if Mr. Roosevelt is elected in 1940, he will drag us into war at the first opportunity, and that, if none presents itself, he will make one."

Japan was at war with China and Germany was at war with Great Britain. Both theatres presented Roosevelt with opportunities for US involvement. Roosevelt was not slow to seize his chance. The first came from the war in the Pacific. In August 1940, the US broke the Japanese 'purple' war-time code giving the Americans the ability to read and understand all Japan's recoverable war-time messages. Machines were manufactured to de-code Japan's messages and these were sent all over the world. But none were sent to *Pearl Harbor*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Hawaiians called the area of *Wai Momi, Pu'uloa*, meaning *Water of Pearl*. It was the home of the shark goddess *Ka'ahupahau* and her son *Kahi'uka* who lived in a cave at the entrance to *Pu'uloa*. The people scraped the barnacles off the sharks' backs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is an edited version of the *World War II* section of *New World Order* by Ken Adachi available as five separate articles: *New World Order*, *World War II*; *World War III*, *World War III*, and *A Biography of the NWO*. The facts have not been verified.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> George Marshall was a member of the *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)* unlike General Douglas MacArthur.

Roosevelt's efforts to involve America while remaining neutral began in August 1940 when the *National Guard* was voted into federal service followed a month later by the *Selective Service Act.*..both for one year. But the key to America's early involvement occurred on 28<sup>th</sup> September 1940, when Japan, Germany and Italy signed the *Tripartite Treaty* requiring that they should all declare war if any of them were attacked by one of the allied nations. If Japan attacked the United States, the US would respond by declaring war on Japan. Germany and Italy would then declare war on America. War with Japan meant war with Germany and Italy.

Roosevelt had made secret commitments to Winston Churchill to become involved in the war against Germany. To meet this commitment without openly dishonouring his pledge to the American people to keep out of the war was to provoke Germany or Japan into attacking the United States of America. Roosevelt first move was in the Pacific theatre. In October, 1940 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox sent for Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of

the American fleet in the Pacific, and informed him that the President wanted a wall of American naval vessels across the western Pacific to make it impossible for Japan to reach any of her sources of oil; a blockade to forcibly prevent Japanese access to the Pacific Ocean. Richardson protested vigorously. He said this would be an act of war, and would lose America its navy. Roosevelt backed off...which poses two interesting questions:

- Q1. Why did Roosevelt, the *Commander-in-Chief* of all America's armed forces, including the *Navy*, not order Admiral Richardson to do his bidding? Why did he politely ask his *Secretary of the Navy* to set up the naval patrol?
- A1. If Roosevelt had used his supreme power in this way he would have been readily identified as the originator of the plan to wage war without the consent of *Congress*.



Furthermore, had Richardson agreed to Knox's proposal and Japan had attacked an American naval vessel Roosevelt could have blamed the admiral for allowing the vessel to get into the position of being fired upon by the *Japanese Navy*. Richardson refused to be set up as a scapegoat.

- Q2. Why did Roosevelt not replace the admiral with someone who would do as he wished?
- A2. Richardson was in a position to identify Roosevelt as the source of the idea should a second admiral agree to it. Roosevelt was reluctant to jeopardize his carefully constructed image as a dove. In November 1940, just after this altercation with the navy, candidate Roosevelt told the American people: "I say to you, fathers and mothers, and I will say it again and again and again, your boys will not be sent into foreign wars."

Richardson knew his position was extremely precarious. He visited Roosevelt twice during 1940 to recommend that the fleet be withdrawn to the west coast of America, because his ships were inadequately manned for war; the Hawaiian area was too exposed for fleet training; and the fleet defences against both air and submarine attacks were far below standard. The American government had done nothing to shore up the defences of *Pearl Harbor* against an offshore attack since the naval manoeuvres of 1932 discovered just how vulnerable the island was. Richardson's reluctance to provide Roosevelt with a pretext for the United States to enter the war and his concern about the status of the *Fleet* led to his being relieved of the *Fleet* command in January 1941.

The *US Ambassador* to Tokyo Joseph Grew was one of the first to discover that *Pearl Harbor* was the intended target of a Japanese attack. He corresponded with President Roosevelt's *State Department* on 27<sup>th</sup> January 1941:

and in return *Ka'ahupahau* and *Kahi'uka* protected the harbor's fish ponds from intruders. Captain James Cook found the harbor teeming with pearl-producing oysters on his arrival in 1769 and it remained this way for the next hundred years as the coral bar obstructing the harbor entrance made it unsuitable as a port. In 1875 the *Kingdom of Hawaii* signed a treaty with the USA, supplemented by the convention of 1884 that was ratified in 1887. The treaty gave the United States exclusive rights to *Pu'uloa* while allowing Hawaiian sugar to enter the USA duty free. Work began immediately to dredge the channel and improve the harbor for large navy ships. In 1908 *Congress* authorized the creation of a naval base at *Pu'uloa* and by 1914 other bases had been built to house the US army and the marines. *Schofield Barracks*, constructed in 1909 to house artillery, cavalry and infantry units, was the largest army post of its day. The development of *Wai Momi* was controversial. When construction on the first dry dock began in 1909, several collapses of the dry dock during construction were attributed to the anger of the shark gods who had to be appeased before work could continue. Ford Island was used by the army and navy for military aviation after 1917 until 1935 when the navy took it over and the army developed *Hickam Field*. Japan's rapid rise as a major global industrial and military power led to more and more ships being berthed at *Wai Momi*. The *US Fleet* was reorganized in February 1941 and by mid-year the entire *US Pacific Fleet* lay at anchor at *Pu'uloa Harbor*. On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1941 the Japanese attack on *Pearl Harbor* provided Roosevelt with the pretext to take the USA into the second world war on the allied side against Germany, Italy and Japan.

"The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breakings out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against *Pearl Harbor*."

In March 1941 President Roosevelt was still hoping for an incident involving the United States and Germany, according to Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's *Secretary of the Interior*: "At dinner on March 24, he [Roosevelt] remarked that 'things are coming to a head; Germany will be making a blunder soon'. There could be no doubt of the President's scarcely concealed desire for an incident to justify our declaring a state of war against Germany."

Roosevelt and Churchill had conspired together to incite an incident to allow America's entry into the war. According to Churchill: "The President has said that he would wage war but not declare it and would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces."

By the middle of 1941 the *United States Navy* had on the job of escorting the convoys to Iceland. The President's orders to the escorts were to attack any U-boat which showed itself, even if it were two or three hundred miles away from the convoy. Everything was to be done to force 'an incident'. Hitler would be faced with the dilemma of either attacking the convoys and clashing with the *United States Navy* or holding off, thus "giving us victory in the *Battle of the Atlantic*. It might suit us in six or eight weeks to provoke Hitler by taunting him with this difficult choice."

But Hitler was bending over backwards to avoid a confrontation with the United States. At the end of July 1941 he instructed his naval commanders to avoid incidents with the United States while the Eastern campaign against Russia was in progress. Two months earlier in April 1941 Churchill had written to Roosevelt after Germany's *Bismarck* had sunk the *Hood*, recommending that a US warship find the *Prinz Eugen* (the *Bismarck*'s escort) and draw her fire "to provide the incident for which the United States would be so thankful;" i.e. bring her into the war.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1941 Hitler turned on his erstwhile ally Russia despite their non-aggression pact. With this action the pressure for the United States to declare war accelerated. On 24<sup>th</sup> June 1941 Roosevelt told the American people: "Of course we are going to give all the aid that we possibly can to Russia." A US program of *Lend-Lease* began,



supplying Russia enormous quantities of war materials on credit.

With Hitler pre-occupied with his *Eastern Front* and avoiding confrontation with the Americans in the Atlantic, Roosevelt turned his attentions to Japan for the incident he needed. The next step was to assist other countries, the English and the Dutch, to embargo oil shipments to Japan to force an incident that would enable the United States to enter the war. Japan, with no oil industry to speak of, would be forced to look elsewhere for its oil.

Ex-President Herbert Hoover saw the manipulations for what they were and in August 1941 warned that "...the American people should insistently demand that *Congress* put a stop to step-by-step projection of the United States into undeclared war." But the *Congress* wasn't listening. President Roosevelt also

chose to ignore the conclusions of *Congressman* Martin Dies, *Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* which had assembled a large body of evidence confirming the widespread suspicions that the Japanese were preparing to invade *Pearl Harbor* and were in possession of vital military information to help them do so successfully.

This information was made available to the *Roosevelt Administration* by Congressman Dies personally. This was the second time that Dies had informed Roosevelt of Japan's intention to attack *Pearl Harbor*. Early in 1941 the *Dies Committee* came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on *Pearl Harbor*. The map had been prepared by the *Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department*. Dies telephoned *Secretary of State* Cordell Hull who spoke to President Roosevelt. Congressman Dies was told not to make the document public and the Roosevelt administration did nothing. In April 1964 when Dies told the American public of these revelations he commented: "If anyone questions the veracity and accuracy of these statements, I will be glad to furnish him with conclusive proof."

In the *Pacific Theatre*, where Washington was reading Japan's war messages, Japanese agents at *Pearl Harbor* were instructed to report ship movements and the nature and location of all ships at anchor. On 16<sup>th</sup> October 1941 the Japanese cabinet resigned and was replaced by General Tojo's military administration, a decisive step toward war. But still nothing was done to alert *Pearl Harbor*. The same day Henry Stimson, Roosevelt's *Secretary of War* wrote

in his diary: "...and so we face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure that Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move - overt move."

Stimson was to repeat the concerns of the Roosevelt administration when he testified before one of the committees investigating *Pearl Harbor*. The record quotes him as saying: "The question was how we should manoeuvre them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

Although the Japanese would still not respond with the incident to provoke the United States into retaliating, the Roosevelt administration was convinced that it would happen eventually. For instance, *Secretary of State* Cordell Hull told Roosevelt on 7<sup>th</sup> November 1941 that he foresaw 'every possibility of an early war with Japan'.

For most of 1941 Japan succeeded in keeping the United States out of the war while continuing their diplomatic efforts to secure a no-war treaty with the *US Secretary of State*. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1941 the Japanese Government wired their ambassador: "Do your best, spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire". But while the Japanese were trying to avoid war, they were being encouraged by an unlikely source to strike out.

On 17<sup>th</sup> May 1941 the *New York Daily News* had featured an article by its Washington correspondent, John O'Donnell who reported that intelligence reports from the Far East were being closely guarded in Washington,

including a 32,000 word confession by Soviet spy Richard Sorge who had infiltrated the German embassy in Japan and convinced Japanese officials not to attack Russia, but strike out south, at the risk of war with the United States.

When Sorge informed the *Kremlin* in October 1941 that the Japanese intended to attack *Pearl Harbor* within the next two months, he was thanked for his report and told that Roosevelt, Marshall and Admiral Stark had been advised of Japanese intentions. On 25<sup>th</sup> November 1941, the day the Japanese fleet sailed for *Pearl Harbor*, President Roosevelt convened a meeting with Stimson, Knox, Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark, the head of naval operations. According to Stimson's testimony, the President brought up the likelihood of being attacked as early as next Monday 'for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning.' However despite the risk in letting the



Japanese fire the first shot the meeting agreed that for the full support of the American people, the Japanese must be permitted to do this. 'There should be no doubt who was the aggressor'.

On 26<sup>th</sup> November 1941, the *Japanese Embassy* in Washington sent the following message to Tokyo: "Hull says that America cannot agree to Japan's treaty proposal." The *British Intelligence Service*, which had men inside the Japanese diplomatic agencies in the United States, took the telegram to mean that Japanese negotiations were off and action could be expected within two weeks.

Roosevelt and the *Department of the Army* also knew of this, because "...a very important *US Army Intelligence* officer, in service in the Far East during 1941...had gained knowledge of the *Yamamoto Plan* to send a task force to attack *Pearl Harbor* and had sent three separate messages to Washington...at least two of which found their way into army files well before the attack on *Pearl Harbor*."

On 6<sup>th</sup> December 1941 the Japanese government sent a message to their Washington embassy instructing them to break off all negotiations with the American government. After the message was de-coded and given to Roosevelt, he is quoted as saying: "This means war." Roosevelt now knew that Japan planned to attack the United States, but still he did nothing to warn US forces at *Pearl Harbor*.

On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1941 Japan launched its 'surprise attack' including orders to the Japanese military to return home should they detect any evidence that the Americans had been alerted. The American forces were not prepared for the attack. The Japanese reported that the American planes were having difficulty getting off the ground. This was because they had been grouped in circles with propellers facing inward following an order from President Roosevelt to group the planes this way because of fears of 'acts of sabotage'. Airplanes do not have a reverse gear, so it was extremely difficult to get them airborne. One critic, Harry Elmer Barnes, wrote: "Bunching the planes in a circle, wing to wing, made them helpless in the event of a surprise air attack."

Another strange circumstance was the make-up of the fleet anchored at *Pearl Harbor* at the time of the attack. The *Pacific Fleet* consisted of nine battleships and three aircraft carriers along with a host of smaller ships. During the attack the Japanese sank or seriously damaged eight battleships but no aircraft carriers. The aircraft carriers were

vital to waging war in the *Pacific* so they had been moved out of *Pearl Harbor* leaving the less valuable battleships behind. Most of these had been built before or during *World War I* so were old, obsolete and expendable.

The US government also withdrew smaller more mobile ships that could be utilized more efficiently in a sea war. On 28<sup>th</sup> November Admiral William Halsey was sent to Wake Island with the carrier *Enterprise*, three heavy destroyers and nine destroyers. On 5<sup>th</sup> December Admiral John Newton was sent to Midway with the carrier *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers. The carrier *Saratoga* was sent to the Pacific Coast.

Admiral Husband Kimmel, the commander of the naval forces at *Pearl Harbor*, clearly places the blame for *Pearl Harbor's* seeming lack of preparedness on President Roosevelt. He has written: "We were unready at *Pearl Harbor* because President Roosevelt's plans required that no word be sent to alert the fleet in Hawaii."

Oliver Lyttleton, a member of Churchill's wartime cabinet, declared in an address to the *American Chamber of Commerce* in London on 24<sup>th</sup> June 1944: "America provoked the Japanese to such an extent they were forced to attack *Pearl Harbor*. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war." The *Council on Foreign Relations* published an article in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1974 agreeing with Lyttleton: "Japan's attack on *Pearl Harbor* actually thrust the United States into *World War II*, but the Roosevelt administration had decided a year and a half earlier to risk war in order to prevent the totalitarian domination of all Europe."

So on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1941, President Roosevelt asked *Congress* to declare war on Japan, stating that December 7, 1941 would go down in history as a 'day of infamy'. Roosevelt lied to *Congress* when he said: "We don't like it, and we didn't want to get in it, but we are in it and we're going to fight it with everything we've got." He had his *Declaration of War* against Japan, followed on 11<sup>th</sup> December by Germany declaring war on the USA. Hitler ignored treaties when it suited him so he chose to use the *Tripartite Treaty* to open hostilities with the USA.

*Pearl Harbor* cost many American lives, the final toll being 2,341 US servicemen dead and 1,143 wounded; eighteen ships including eight battleships were sunk or heavily damaged; more than 200 *Army Air Corps* and *Navy* planes were destroyed or unusable; and 68 civilians were killed. For his supposed unpreparedness at *Pearl Harbor*, Admiral Kimmel was relieved of his command, retiring on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1942.



At the end of the war *Congress* looked into the reasons for the lack of preparation at *Pearl Harbor* and concluded: (1) the attack was not provoked by America; (2) there was no evidence that the President or the secretaries of State, War or the Navy provoked the attack; (3) The American government made every effort to avoid war with Japan; (4) the attack was caused by the Army's and Navy's failure to detect hostile forces; (5) the errors made were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.

The final point ensured that the commanders of the armed forces could not be court-martialed. Admiral Kimmel and General Walter Short, the commander of the armed forces at *Pearl Harbor*, repeatedly demanded a court martial to clear their names but this was never granted.

Admiral Robert Theobold, commander of all destroyers at *Pearl Harbor*, wrote a book, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, detailing his conclusions about the 'surprise attack'. He concluded that: (a) President Roosevelt enticed Japan to attack by holding the *Pacific fleet* in Hawaiian waters unprotected; (b) the plans to use *Pearl Harbor* as the bait started in June, 1940; (c) war with Japan meant war with Germany; (d) Roosevelt, Marshall and Stark knew about *Pearl Harbor* 21 hours before the attack.

Yet in spite of all of this evidence that the Japanese attack on *Pearl Harbor* was known by Roosevelt and his top advisors well in advance of the actual event, many people still believe that the *US Government* and Roosevelt in particular, knew nothing about it.